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Introduction 
With few exceptions, mainstream sociology has been aligned closely with traditional metaphys- 
ics. For this reason, many critics have argued that sociology is basically a conservative discipline.' 
The focus of study has been to explain and, in many cases, justify the prevailing social arrange- 
ments. The maintenance of order, in short, has been the key project of many sociologists. 
As an orientation, attempting to understand and bolster the effectiveness of institutions is not 
inherently problematic. But when this strategy or modus operandi is coupled with the social ontol- 
ogy that traditionally has been adopted, many problems arise. To borrow from Dennis Wrong, the 
message is conveyed that order cannot survive without the aid of a vast system of social contr01.~ 
Most important is that persons are believed to be dysfunctional unless they are constrained. Spe- 
cifically, persons can be integrated into society, and treated as normal, only through the influence 
of profound external forces. 
In this regard, most sociologists have been social realists. Examples of this approach can be 
found in the work of Comte, Durkheim, and Parsons. Realists believe order must have a founda- 
tion that transcends the contingencies of daily life, including both existential and political consider- 
ations. Durkheim referred to this base as a "reality sui generis, while Parsons tied the fate of 
humanity to the acceptance and preservation of an all-encompassing social system. In each case, 
the source of order is severed from human action and autonomy. 
Throughout the Western tradition this maneuver has been used to reinforce a variety of phe- 
nomena, ranging from personal identity to morality. Central to the success of this method is dual- 
ism. That is, the assumption is made that particular norms can be divorced from human contingen- 
cies and idealized, thereby establishing universally recognizable rules of demeanor. Because these 
norms are unfettered by human praxis, they are thought to be objective and thus provide a reliable 
base for order. In this way, an Archimedean point is available to a serve as a referent for adjudicat- 
ing claims and evaluating behavior. 
In contemporary parlance, a complete or totalistic conception of order is provided by realists. 
Perspective is pass6, because truth is elevated beyond individual and collective interests. Behav- 
ioral expectations, accordingly, cannot be obscured by values or other human foibles. Consistent 
with what Durkheim had in mind, social reality is given a seignorial status that cannot be threat- 
ened even by a corrupt government. Similar to Plato's Forms, Divine laws, or natural facts, social 
reality has a transcendent character. Moral or ethical principles are thus able to ward off any 
attack. 
Clearly, realism facilitates the enforcement of norms. On the other hand, however, persons are 
led to believe that in the absence of a justification that exists sui generis norms cannot be either 
proposed or enforced. Without an exalted foundation that structures and legitimizes interaction, 
, 
persons cannot confer with others, coordinate their actions, agree on how institutions should oper- 
ate, or sanction those who violate the rules that are enacted. Realism, as Erich Fromm noted at 
one time, saves society from collapse, but also diminishes those who inhabit the social world.3 In 
many respects, realism allows democratic sensibilities to atrophy, along with an appreciation of 
cultural pluralism. As a result, society becomes nothing more than a lifeless but intrusive abstrac- 
tion. 
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The Postmodern Threat 
Postmodernism represents an assault on the 
approach realists have taken to conceptualiz- 
ing knowledge and order. Heidegger, for ex- 
ample, asks why such a strategy has been toler- 
ated for so long, given the contradictions that 
are inherent to realism. Nonetheless, daring to 
question realism has earned postmodernists an 
unsavory reputat ion.Vor example, they are 
accused of undermining culture and bringing 
modern civilization to the brink of chaos. Af- 
ter all, they show no regard for the principles 
and standards that have allowed select societ- 
ies to grow and prosper. 
With respect to current politics, they are 
lia believed to discard the commitments and moral 
guidelines that have enabled a range of activ- 
ists to intervene at appropriate times to improve 
the conditions of disadvantaged persons. Sim- 
ply put, postmodernists have undermined any 
valid basis for formulating a fair and equitable 
social cont ra~t .~  Habermas has been instrumen- 
tal in pqpularizing this critique of 
postmodernism. According to him and his sup- 
porters, giving credence to postmodernism is 
synonymous with embracing social atomism and 
accepting the laissez-faire outlook on econom- 
ics and other aspects of social life. And because 
the philosophy of laissez-faire provides no ba- 
sis for order other than freely chosen contacts, 
which many conservatives believe are optional, 
social correctives have no purpose. Indeed, con- 
sidering the resulting elusive nature of society, 
where are interventions supposed to be di- 
rected? 
Nonetheless, broadly defined, 
postmodernists have had a lot of followers 
throughout the Twentieth Century. Proponents 
of dada, surrealism, existentialism, and phenom- 
enology, for example, have rejected realism. 
Consistent with Lyotard's definition of 
postmodernism, they refused to give credence 
to the "metanarratives"-ultimate referents 
such as Forms, God, or reality sui generis-re- 
alists invoke to support knowledge and order.6 
As described by AndrC Breton, there is now a 
profound "crisis of the object." The object is no 
longer hegemonic and cannot be trusted. 
Not only do postmodernists refute these 
metanarratives, they argue these factors are re- 
sponsible for alienation and repression. For 
example, installing absolutes to sustain society 
undercuts personal agency and the need for in- 
dividuals to act collectively. The fate of society 
is guaranteed by the presence of metanarratives, 
but the direction that is taken may be very re- 
strictive. Everyday existence may appear to be 
a fait acompli. 
Lyotard summarizes the postmodern posi- 
tion by adopting Wittgenstein's anti-metaphysi- 
cal stance. ~ ~ o t a r d m a i n t a i n s  that all knowl- 
edge is mediated thoroughly by "language 
games." The identities of all phenomena, in 
other words, are tied intimately to changes in 
language use. Nothing, not even objectivity, 
escapes from the influence of interpretat i~n.~ 
Due to the ubiquity of language, attempting to 
overcome interpretation is futile. According to 
postmodernists, persons are condemned to con- 
front a world that is always already interpreted. 
There is no hope of discovering the usual 
sources of pure Being. Neither God nor nature 
is pristine; as Foucault says, both God and Man 
are dead. Postmodernism is thus anti-meta- 
physical, because there is no place to go beyond 
the sphere of everyday language. There is noth- 
ing outside of language or interpretation that 
insures the accuracy of speech or the validity of 
norms. Instead of trying to reveal eternal truth, 
claims Rorty, postmodernists must be content 
with exploring the various ways in which the 
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world is deployed and understanding the mode 
of praxis that is operative in each case.8 In this 
way, human solidarity may be achieved in the 
absence of ontological security. Persons can 
begin to unite on the basis of agreement or the 
recognition of various styles of personal or cul- 
tural difference. 
But interpretation has never been thought 
to provide a sound foundation for society. At 
best, interpretations accumulate with no end in 
sight. Which interpretation is most authorita- 
tive? According to Durkheim, this uncertainty 
breeds anomie. Choices must be made about 
the validity of interpretations, without any es- 
cape from the mise-en-abime of language. Clar- 
ity rests on more talk. For realists, this condi- 
tion is untenable and frightening. Interpreta- 
tion, for them, is the source of disorder, rather 
than a remedy for this problem. 
Given the framework proposed Eiy realists, 
postmodernism is a threat to principled inter- 
action. Consistent with Raul Hausmann's view 
of existence, postmodernists believe that "man- 
kind is simultaneous, a monstrosity of proper 
and alien parts, now, before, after, and simulta- 
neo~s ly . "~  Contrary to this description, real- 
ists object to any attempt to obscure what they 
believe are cultural universals. Still, the ques- 
tion remains: Does postmodernism preclude the 
type of intervention that many critics believe is 
necessary to establish a just order? Is the social 
contract, accordingly, rendered obsolete by 
postmodernists? 
Despite the charges of cultural bankruptcy 
that have been levelled against postmodernists, 
they have been careful to address the issue of 
order. Although they disagree with realists, tak- 
ing this position does not automatically warrant 
the dismissal of postmodernism. Opposition to 
realism does not lead inherently to anarchy! 
Nevertheless, a new way of conceptualizing or- 
der must be entertained that has not been given 
serious attention because of the dominance of 
realism. This new approach, moreover, does 
not preclude establishing a fair and just society. 
All that is really subverted by postmodernism 
is recourse to the usual "higher forces" that have 
been sought to avert disorder. Most important, 
postmodernists are not affected by the fear of 
spontaneity that realists try to instill in the gen- 
eral public. 
A World without Ranscendence 
Postmodernists lead persons to the place 
that Martin Buber refers to as the realm of the 
"in-between."l0 This is the space that exists 
between the twin abstractions of the individual 
and the collective. Both of these options, Buber 
contends, encourage irresponsibility toward oth- 
ers. Portrayals of social life that focus on either 
of these elements obscure the direct relation- 
ship between persons, as a result of emphasiz- 
ing individual freedom or group cohesion. This 
direct link between persons, moreover, provides 
the framework for establishing order and un- 
dertaking political action. 
Lyotard declares that "no man is an island," 
and that persons share a common destiny be- 
fore they decide formally to  unite." What 
Lyotard is saying is that although persons inter- 
pret themselves and other facets of reality, they 
do not do this is isolation from one another. 
Even prior to their birth, persons are integrated 
into the history of a host of others. As Levinas 
describes, persons are fundamentally open to 
others; the "I" has direct access to everyone else. 
In sum, postmodernists are not atomists. 
As many phenomenologists have illustrated, 
persons are intersubjectively associated and 
cannot escape from this condition. Even when 
they strive for solitude, the presence of others 
is presupposed. In other words, dealing with 
the other is not optional, a product of instilling 
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sympathy or righteousness that is derived from 
eternal moral mandates. An awareness of oth- 
ers precedes all moralizing about the need for 
persons to exhibit charity or love. Basic to ev- 
ery persons is the other. Accordingly, Levinas 
announces that ethics precedes all speculation 
about freedom or personal rights. 
But what is the sociological relevance of this 
talk about a basic connection to the other? 
Postmodernists have demonstrated that realists 
are wrong about the need for a metaphysical 
bridge to unite persons. Instead, there is an 
essential tie between persons, a vital balance 
that cannot be denied. In short, the self and 
the other develop together. There is nothing 
lost, therefore, by rejecting realism and a real- 
ity sui generis, for the successful use of this ab- 
straction presupposes an awareness of the other. 
Bringing persons together assumes they under- 
stand the process of forming a unit. Absolutes, 
in fact, are built on this activity. 
The social world is not a mystery that is or- 
ganized by metaphysical props. Social existence, 
instead, is predicated on the nexus of the self 
and other. As Lyotard describes, the social bond 
is a "fabric formed by the intersection of at least 
two (and in reality an indeterminate number) 
of language games."I2 Nothing else is needed 
to engender order. Relative to the usual ab- 
stractions, this base is fragile. 
Nonetheless, the "in-between" is substan- 
tial enough to support metaphysics and any 
norms that may be relevant. This conjunction 
of self and other can also be the focus of politi- 
cal interventions. Intersubjectivity enables the 
association of self and other to be institutional- 
ized and, if necessary, improved. What more is 
needed to have discussions and implement poli- 
cies about order? 
The Nature of Praxis 
a. Human action is not random or haphaz- 
ard. All modes of praxis, writes Fish, are prin- 
cipled, in that they have parameters and an ori- 
entation.13 Language, in other words, is a pur- 
poseful activity that embodies particular rules 
and semantic boundaries. Every interpretation 
represents a particular epistemological commit- 
ment. Linguistic order is thus always present, 
although a specific style may violate traditional 
standards of speech. The controversy over 
Ebonics is an example of this sort of misunder- 
standing. Those who are fluent in Ebonics do 
not speak aimlessly and constantly 
miscommunicate to one another; Ebonics does 
not represent the absence of language, as pro- 
ponents of Standard English contend, but an- 
other option. 
b. Behavior is not idiosyncratic. That is, 
persons are not atoms that are closed off from 
the rest of the world. Any deployment of the 
world, therefore, is potentially accessible to ev- 
eryone. But persons cannot be enamored of 
their own reality to the extent that other inter- 
pretive modes are obscured or  distorted. 
Postmodernists address this issue in their dis- 
cussions of madness.14 They argue that tradi- 
tionally psychologists and psychiatrists have 
been unable to enter the world of the mad, be- 
cause of their strict adherence to the scientific 
worldview. This existential region is accessible 
but masked by what is believed to be the 
epitome of reason. As a result, little is really 
known about madness, other than what profes- 
sional researchers and clinicians have said about 
this phenomenon. 
c. Norms are not relative. Critics of 
postmodernism conclude erroneously that this 
philosophy imparts the disastrous idea that 
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"anything goes." But this conclusion is unwar- 
ranted for two reasons. First, every existential 
region has norms that are known to its mem- 
bers. The parameters of right and wrong, for 
example, are delineated for every participant in 
a particular linguistic community to examine in 
a variety of ways. A linguistic community, ar- 
gues Fish, "share[s] interpretive strategies" for 
identifying and classifying events.15 Rules are 
thus regional. The problem voiced by realists 
is that multiple communities exist. 
And second, the human mind is reflexive, 
thereby allowing persons to overcome their re- 
spective constructions of reality and enter other 
worlds. Because of the dynamic character of 
interpretation, the mind is not a blank slate or 
some other inert object. A part of the process 
of interpretation is reinterpretation, which im- 
plies the presence of multiple interpretations. 
This awareness is the factor that enables per- 
sons to entertain seriously claims about alter- 
native realities. 
d. Justice is not left without a rationale. 
Although the typical rendition of justice-de- 
rived from --has a cosmic base, an abstrac- 
tion of this sort is not necessary to promote fair- 
ness. At the nexus of the self and other prohi- 
bitions can be established against alienation, 
exploitation, degradation, and so forth. Propos- 
ing that all persons should be treated with dig- 
nity does not have to be sanctioned by God or 
Natural Law.16 Without the aid of these intru- 
sive and potentially repressive elements, solu- 
tions to ethical questions can be proposed and 
institutionalized. For this reason, Derrida has 
begun to talk about neighborliness as an appro- 
priate ethical principle in a postmodern world. 
Ethics, in this sense, has a human foundation. 
As should be noted, postmodernists do not 
abandon a commitment to promoting commu- 
nities. They do not leave the world defenseless 
against attempts to ignore, diminish, violate, or, 
in many ways, depreciate the other. If the aim 
of politics includes supporting old persons, 
postmodernists do not subvert this task. None- 
theless, the logic for this assistance cannot be 
attributed to ethereal considerations, but must 
emanate from discourse. There is no ultimate 
justification to prevent persons from creating 
an inhumane society, if they desire such a world. 
Politics Without Guarantees 
-, 
. Usually guarantees have been sought to 
substantiate order. These absolutes, however, 
have fostered the development of hierarchies 
and other approaches to marginalizing persons. 
The expectation is that everyone will strive'to 
internalize these ideals, and those who refuse 
or cannot adhere to these standards will be 
pushed to the periphery of society. A by-prod- 
uct of the social imagery espoused by realists is 
repressive conformity, whereby challenges to 
these absolutes are discouraged or prevented. 
Marcuse, for example, refers to this situation 
as the product of an "affirmative culture."17 
Postmodernists, on the other hand, promote 
a rhizomic world.18 Because no foundation can 
be attributed legitimately the status required by 
realism, the various regions of existence must 
extend laterally. Like a rhizome, order extends 
in different directions simultaneously without 
a center. To borrow from the history of art, or- 
der resembles a collage. In each case, elements 
are juxtaposed and arranged without anyone 
becoming dominant. "Mutually distinct reali- 
ties," remarks Max Ernst, are joined in a "for- 
tuitous encounter." According to these mod- 
els, cultural differences can proliferate without 
chaos. In fact, adding different pieces enhances 
the beauty of the mixture. 
But what is the moral principle that guides 
the development of a rhizome or collage? Sim- 
ply put, each element in the composite has in- 
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tegrity that must be protected and preserved. 
No wonder Buber claims the fundamental rule 
is "love your neighbor as yourself", and that 
everything else is simply commentary on this 
maxim.I9 The Golden Rule, as it is sometimes 
called, is postmodern because order is engen- 
dered through respect for cultural differences. 
Love of myself, despite the uniqueness of 
my origin and history, can lead to the recogni- 
tion and promotion of a wide range of other 
persons. Like me, each person has a unique 
character that should not be violated. The rec- 
ognition of difference, regardless of what con- 
servatives say, is not antithetical to social har- 
mony. For Buber, the recognition of difference 
is at the basis of the Hasidic community he 
i hopes to build in Israel and elsewhere. 
Moreover, within the milieu spawned by the 
rhizome or collage, social critique is possible.20 
Although many critics believe that 
postmodernists do not provide the means to 
criticize capitalism, this objection is short- 
sighted. The asymmetrical class relations that 
are central to the operation of capitalism are 
anathema to the rhizome. The economic ad- 
vantages accorded to some persons in capital- 
ism cause a social imbalance that would not be 
found in a rhizomic order. Actually, capitalism 
expands because of the violation of the other 
that postmodernists reject. According to 
postmodern social imagery, criticism of the 
philosophical assumptions of capitalism are not 
only possible but desirable. 
Of course, the desirability of social symme- 
try can be discovered in religious inspiration. 
Paul Tillich, for example, hoped for this out- 
come. But the point made by postmodernists is 
that this mode of association can be established 
on a less esoteric base, such as the nexus of self 
and other. Furthermore, the rhizome and col- 
lage provide insight into social solidarity that 
does not require the evisceration of the human 
condition; the discovery of morality does not 
require the suppression of praxis. Persons are 
thus free to abandon capitalism or any other 
system that is predicated on social asymmetry. 
Postmodernists do not jettison the public 
sphere. The traditional reality sui generis is 
gone, but not the place where critiques, poli- 
cies, and practices can be discussed and enacted. 
The nexus of the self and other is the public 
arena, where hierarchy and marginalization can 
be illustrated to transgress the image of moral- 
ity conveyed by the rhizome or collage. Any 
proposals that undercut the symmetry of the self 
and other, no matter how natural they may be 
made to appear, can be confronted and tossed 
aside. 
Conclusion 
Versions of order proposed by mainstream 
sociologists have been overwhelmingly realis- 
tic. The model of morality that is associated 
with this philosophy is hierarchical. As de- 
scribed by Parsons, an "ultimate reality" ar- 
ranges all subordinate components of the so- 
cial system.21 In the absence of the dictates that 
originate from this exalted source, social coor- 
dination is believed to be impossible. 
Postmodernists believe this vertical arrange- 
ment is justified by dualism that is passe. There- 
fore, they maintain the only alternative is a 
model that is tied to praxis. The resulting moral 
order is horizontal and excludes the element of 
domination. Any political or economic philoso- 
phy, accordingly, that includes subordination 
can be challenged and rejected. Conveyed by 
the rhizome are standards of order that are as 
legitimate as those linked to traditional meta- 
physics. 
The point is that realists do not have a mo- 
nopoly on models of order and morality. A hi- 
erarchy may be more compatible with their eco- 
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nomic agenda or religious beliefs, for example, tional and devoid of morality. Order without a 
but this style of organization is neither natural hierarchy, furthermore, does not preclude the 
nor necessary. On the other hand, a model of use of political interventions to insure that domi- 
order that is dialogical, and regulated by the nation does not arise. 
recognition of difference, is not inherently irra- 
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